Abstract
Accurate and synchronized timing information is required by power system operators for controlling the grid infrastructure (relays, Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), etc.) and determining asset positions. Satellite-based global positioning system (GPS) is the primary source of timing information. However, GPS disruptions today (both intentional and unintentional) can significantly compromise the reliability and security of our electric grids. A robust alternate source for accurate timing is critical to serve both as a deterrent against malicious attacks and as a redundant system in enhancing the resilience against extreme events that could disrupt the GPS network. To achieve this, we rely on the highly accurate, terrestrial atomic clock-based network for alternative timing and synchronization. In this paper, we discuss an experimental setup for an alternative timing approach. The data obtained from this experimental setup is continuously monitored and analyzed using various time deviation metrics. We also use these metrics to compute deviations of our clock with respect to the National Institute of Standards and Technologys (NIST) GPS data. The results obtained from these metric computations are elaborately discussed. Finally, we discuss the integration of the procedures involved, like real-time data ingestion, metric computation, and result visualization, in a novel microservices-based architecture for situational awareness.
