


ENERGY DIVISION



Sam A. Carnes

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The author is grateful for the insights provided by interviewees from Oregon’s Office of Emergency Management and the Oregon Health Division and Morrow and Umatilla Counties about the problems and prospects for implementing the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) in Oregon. I also benefited from insights obtained during a temporary assignment in the Region X office of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in Bothell, Washington, during the spring of 1998. My approach to developing recommendations regarding the organization and staffing of CSEPP in Oregon and its affected counties was fundamentally based on evidence from the field—from people who work, in a paid or decision-making capacity, to implement CSEPP to provide enhanced protection for the citizens of Oregon in the event of an accidental release of chemical agent from Umatilla Chemical Depot. All of the people interviewed for this report are devoted to the singular goal of providing such protection, even though their efforts may, at times, be less focused and organized than might optimally be the case. Their intent, however, is unquestionable.

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This report provides an analysis of CSEPP implementation in Morrow and Umatilla Counties in terms of how those local governments and the State of Oregon are organized to accomplish their missions and how the existing staff are doing their jobs. It is not intended to be a systematic evaluation of these issues. Instead, it provides an outside perspective on how organization and staffing are affecting CSEPP's implementation. It offers a number of alternative organizational and staffing approaches that might be considered for completing CSEPP implementation in Morrow and Umatilla Counties and the State of Oregon and the advantages and disadvantages of those alternatives.

Determining the appropriate level and mix of CSEPP staffing in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties is an ambitious task, but it is all the more daunting given the organizational complexity of CSEPP. Without addressing the current and historical organizational arrangements, however, and identifying and potentially adopting some alternative future organizational arrangement, it is unlikely that changes in CSEPP staffing, taken alone, would have more than a transitory effect. For that reason, this report also addresses the organizational arrangements for CSEPP implementation in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties.

This analysis is based fundamentally on a comparison of CSEPP functions and tasks as outlined in planning guidance and information obtained from reviews of position descriptions, organization charts and CSEPP materials, and from in-depth interviews with Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla County CSEPP staff and managers and other elected or appointed officials. With few exceptions, the interviews were conducted in person with each interviewee, during the second week of November and the second week of December, 1998. A few interviews were conducted over the telephone after this time frame to avoid the necessity and expense of traveling a third time to eastern Oregon. Each interview lasted approximately one hour.

During the course of the interviews with CSEPP staff and managers and elected officials a number of concerns related to CSEPP implementation were identified. These included a sometimes disputatious history regarding the appropriate distribution of authority and responsibility for CSEPP, difficulties encountered in the budget process, wage and salary differentials for staff employed by different jurisdictions, problems of interpersonal relations among staff and managers and elected officials in the different jurisdictions, and the attrition of personnel. Quite often these concerns were related in the context of one of the most recent CSEPP efforts, the procurement of tone alert radios. Some of the historical background relevant to these and other concerns related to CSEPP implementation has been the success of Morrow County, as measured by a number of issues, as compared to Umatilla County in implementing CSEPP.

The report assesses the advantages and disadvantages of the current and alternative organizational arrangements for CSEPP implementation. The current arrangement is one in which the two separate counties have developed their own implementation strategies in a manner that has occasionally been only loosely coordinated, and these efforts have been overseen fairly stringently by the state. The alternative organizational arrangements that are assessed include a Bi-County management concept (where the two counties' programs are integrated and managed by a single entity), a State management concept (where the State assumes responsibility for CSEPP implementation in consultation with the elected officials of the counties), and a State and Morrow County management concept (where the State conducts its current oversight of Morrow County's implementation and assumes responsibility for implementation in Umatilla County). Although there

are advantages and disadvantages of the current and these alternative arrangements, on balance the preferred approach would be either to maintain the current approach if a strong Umatilla County CSEPP manager and leader

could be retained or the State and Morrow County management concept if no such manager could be retained.

The report also assess the current composition of CSEPP-funded staff positions and compares that with the kind of positions likely to be needed to bring CSEPP to a state of readiness in the near future. Currently there are approximately 20 staff and management positions funded by CSEPP in Oregon (chiefly in the Office of Emergency Management) and the two counties, with approximately one-half of all staff positions filled by the State. This distribution represents an inversion of the staffing originally anticipated, in which local governments and communities (operationalized in this case as the counties) were expected to bear the significant share of the burden of CSEPP implementation with the state providing technical support, guidance, and oversight and little, if any, implementation responsibility. Although there are valid reasons for the staff composition having developed the way it has in Oregon and the two counties, this does not displace the original rationale or the current reality of what has to be done to complete CSEPP implementation in eastern Oregon.

Rather than making radical changes to the current staffing pattern (i.e., to reverse completely the current staffing pattern), some changes are suggested are made to hire some new staff (or provide contractor assistance) to support some near-term implementation efforts and to re-assign some current staff to meet current implementation concerns. These changes include some fairly substantial changes and some that are less so. The former category includes the elimination of support for the OEM Director (to be consistent with CSEPP implementation in other states), provision of support for planning that is needed to update and upgrade implementing procedures, hiring a CSEPP manager for Umatilla County (if the current organizational approach is maintained), and assuring there is sufficient support to implement a concerted public education and information program. The other changes include moving the OEM staff positions based in Salem to Pendleton (or increase substantially the amount of time people holding these positions spend in the field), reassigning the Umatilla County Logistics Coordinator to be a Bi-County position supporting both counties in managing emergency preparedness and response resources (e.g., TAR units, PPE, and shelter-in-place kits), reducing the communications coordination responsibilities of both the OEM and Bi-County positions to one-half time but amending the job descriptions to allow the individuals holding those positions to support other aspects of the program, and reassigning the budget/fiscal coordination tasks of the State Assistant CSEPP Manager to the State fiscal coordinator (and make that position full time) and assign responsibility for coordinating and guiding state and county planning and public education/ information activities to the State Assistant CSEPP Manager.

Regardless of any staff changes that might be made, it is important to recognize that virtually all CSEPP-funded staff and managers need to be expert in their own positions but capable in all of them. There will be times, particularly given the relatively brief period of time available to reach CSEPP maintenance, that any given staff position will be under-staffed and will require the support and help of other staff and managers. If all CSEPP staff and managers (and elected officials) are members of the same team, that is not an unreasonable expectation or condition. If, however, there is disagreement and concern over how the program is being implemented (and by whom, with how many resources, and to accomplish what objective), implementation will be problematic.

Identifying, hiring, training, retaining, challenging, and rewarding the people responsible for implementing CSEPP, and assuring their coordinated and integrated efforts on an on-going basis, are critical to accomplishing the job at hand. The development of a CSEPP *team*, imbued with common goals and objectives while allowing for and, in fact, encouraging individual innovation, enthusiasm, and entrepreneurship, is perhaps the most important activity that must be accomplished to implement CSEPP successfully.

Developing and maintaining a CSEPP team is similar to team-building associated with virtually any complex and multi-jurisdictional activity. However well thought-out an initial plan might be, plans evolve, people move in and out, priorities change, problems are encountered, solutions are identified and implemented, new plans and priorities develop. All is change. This accentuates the reality that team-building is a dynamic process and requires constant attention from all levels of management and staff. It also accentuates the need to identify and appreciate the different perspectives brought to bear on the problem by the various parties.

It should be noted that some of the factual details relevant to this study have changed since the inception and preparation of the preliminary draft of this study (e.g., Umatilla County has now hired a CSEPP manager, namely the former Umatilla County public information officer).

Subsequent to, and in place of, this request, FEMA Region X asked Oak Ridge National Laboratory, through FEMA Headquarters, to conduct this "staffing study" for the implementation of the CSEPP in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties. This study is intended to provide FEMA Region X with information regarding the adequacy and appropriateness of current staffing levels at both the State and County levels and identify near-term staffing needs of these jurisdictions. Because of the close relationship between and among staffing and organizational arrangements to accomplish implementation, this study also examines the current organizational scheme for CSEPP implementation and identifies and evaluates alternative arrangements in combination with staffing alternatives.

The proximate cause of the original request for an assessment and, subsequently, this study was the recognition that several changes affecting CSEPP positions at both the State and County levels have been made within the last two years and ongoing requests for staffing changes in the CSEPP budget process were being made. Some of the significant changes have been:

- moving several OEM positions from the Salem office to the Pendleton area,
- conversion of contract employees to full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees,
- using funds from previous positions in either Morrow or Umatilla Counties to fund "bi-county" positions (Automation Systems Support Analyst, tone alert radio (TAR)/Logistics Coordinator),
- transferring responsibility for procurement of TARs from the State (OEM) to the Counties (as a bi-county activity)
- transferring positions from one office/location to another (TAR/Logistics Coordinator, personal protective equipment (PPE) Coordinator, Medical Officer), and
- adding new staff positions and reorganizing job functions (e.g., conversion of the old OEM CSEPP Policy Advisor position to an Assistant CSEPP Program Manager to the OEM Pendleton office).

In fact, since the beginning of this study, additional staff changes have occurred that suggest the timeliness of a review of staffing levels—the individual occupying the Umatilla County CSEPP Project Manager position resigned from the program and a replacement has not been hired, the TAR/Logistics Coordinator has resigned from her bi-county position and has taken an Assistant Program Manager position with the State of Oregon's OEM office in Pendleton, and Umatilla County has hired a Logistics Coordinator. In addition, requests for a new position (e.g., CSEPP Planner) or increases in the level of funding for an existing position (e.g., OEM Financial Advisor from 0.5 FTE to 1.0 FTE) have been made by the State or the Counties.

Determining the appropriate level and mix of CSEPP staffing in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties is an ambitious task, but it is all the more daunting given the organizational complexity of CSEPP. Without addressing the current and historical organizational arrangements, however, and identifying and potentially adopting some alternative future organizational arrangement, it is unlikely that changes in CSEPP staffing, taken alone, would have more than a transitory effect. For that reason, this report also addresses the organizational arrangements for CSEPP implementation in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties and, to a limited extent, their relationships with FEMA Region X and FEMA Headquarters.

Since its inception in 1988, CSEPP was to provide enhanced emergency preparedness capabilities for off-site populations surrounding the Army's installations storing chemical warfare agent. As noted at the beginning of CSEPP, there are three basic objectives for the program (for example, see Emergency Response Concept Plan for Umatilla Depot Activity and Vicinity, 1989):

- loss reduction,
- community participation, and
- functional equivalency.

Loss reduction, as measured primarily by avoidance of fatalities given an accidental release of chemical agent, is obviously the most important objective of CSEPP. Thus, whenever feasible, decisions are to be driven by concern for public safety. A second goal is to obtain a preparedness strategy and capability that is publicly acceptable and, thus, workable. Thus, the goal of community participation maintains that the citizens affected by the emergency preparedness program and activities need to become a part of the planning process. Finally, since there are a total of eight storage/disposal sites involved in CSEPP, the allocation of resources cannot be biased toward any given site. Each site, however, has different needs and may opt for different approaches. It is therefore important that each site receives enhancements that are more or less equivalent from a functional perspective, or are not denied resources that are functionally equivalent. The equitable distribution of resources should also contribute to public acceptance of the CSEPP.

The extent to which emergency management staff and managers and elected officials in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties can achieve CSEPP's objectives in light of current organizational and staffing arrangements is the focus of this study. That is, this analysis addresses organizational and staffing in the context of how and whether CSEPP's internal stakeholders can meet basic CSEPP objectives. In addition, the analysis looks at organization and staffing in the context of fundamental CSEPP functions and tasks and how they are expected to develop over time:

- developing overall program structure,
- developing and maintaining emergency systems,
- developing and maintaining support functions,
- conducting emergency operations, and
- conducting recovery operations.

In addition, and where appropriate, each of these basic functions and tasks is considered in greater detail. That is, the participation of different organizations and staff in achieving particular tasks or objectives (e.g., developing exercise and training programs, public education and information programs, and developing and maintaining alert and notification and warning systems) is examined to identify where there is possible redundancy and whether such redundancy leads to non-productive conflict and delay in program implementation or to enhanced system design and implementation.



The implementation of CSEPP in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties is a political process informed by technical issues. As such, issues related to the centralization and decentralization of responsibility and authority are fundamental to implementation. Who, or what agency, has the power and authority to make decisions (and what kinds of decisions), and who, or what agency, has the responsibility to implement decisions?


CSEPP is a classic problem of intergovernmental policy implementation—defining, debating, and resolving problems among cooperating and, occasionally, competing levels and units of government. Each of these levels and units of government, and their individual staff, managers, and elected officials, can be construed as “stakeholders” in the policy domain that is CSEPP.¹ There are other stakeholders—particularly the first responders and the people to be protected—who, although not directly a part of this analysis in the sense that data and information have not been collected from them, are critical actors in the implementation of CSEPP.²

In the context of current CSEPP policy, the decision making framework can be envisioned as shown in Fig. 2.1. Once stakeholder concerns have been considered by a decision-making authority, a decision is rendered (i.e., decision output) and implemented. Once implemented, the outcome of the decision is monitored to determine if the decision and its implementation resolved the problem at hand; if necessary, the decision and implementation are adjusted through feedback loops. Of course, it is possible that the initial decision (or proposal) cannot be implemented if sufficient opposition to the decision emerges.

This decision environment represents a complex network of stakeholders and decision makers. It can be argued that on many issues, FEMA, in consultation with the Department of the Army and Congress, represents the decision making authority, but CSEPP cannot function effectively without the full cooperation of subsidiary authorities. As such, the decision environment is filled with feedback loops that provide opportunities either for consensus decision making and implementation or policy gridlock.

¹ In this report, I refer to the various individuals and groups who have an interest in the outcome of a particular decision as “stakeholders.” This term applies whether or not the interested person or group is directly involved in a given decision or its implementation. We can distinguish among participating and nonparticipating stakeholders, as well as among “internal” and “external” stakeholders. For CSEPP, internal stakeholders are all offices, staff, managers, and elected officials, while external stakeholders encompass the broad range of other interested parties, including the people who are to be protected by CSEPP.

² With the growth of an investigative fourth estate that thrives on the identification and amplification of social problems (see Mazur 1988, Vig 1988), including issues related to emergency management and preparedness, there is every likelihood that those who might be affected by a given problem or governmental attempts to solve that problem will know about it. Once informed, those who want to participate will participate. If not “allowed” to participate (e.g., through proactive participation programs), stakeholders will do so anyway, albeit through less cooperative, and potentially less efficient, means than might otherwise be the case (e.g., non-compliance, half-hearted implementation, litigation and civil disobedience).



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The conventional image of decision making held by the publics and stakeholders, as likely as not, is one in which decisions are easily identified, as are the decision makers, the steps in the process, and the logical relationships between the steps in the process. In reality, particularly when problem solving becomes so drawn out, so complex, and so much a product of multiple participation that no one identifies himself or herself as making policy, it is more appropriate to view decision making as far more diffuse than this conventional images suggests (Lindblom 1990). As noted by Weiss (1980), decision making may actually consist of one, a few, or many small steps (e.g., writing a memo, answering an inquiry, editing a draft of a regulation). Any one of these actions has “seemingly small consequences,” but “over a period of time these many small steps foreclose alternative course of action and limit the range of the possible” (1980:401). Before anyone knows it, a decision has been made.


This incrementalist understanding of decision making, particularly for the resolution of “routine” problems, has significant implications for the analytical framework used to understand decision making and the role of public and stakeholder participation in decision making. As noted by Lindblom (1990), the “ever-changing, open-ended continuity of most social problem solving” is better understood with selective contributions to assist the self-probing and self-guiding society, rather than a standard, “do-it-all” policy analytic framework. According to Lindblom (1990:274), the latter framework assumes a single problem to be defined, then solved, a task with a well-marked beginning and end. In fact problems, year after year, require reexamination and redefinition. A failure at one point redirects subsequent problem solving, often with a new goal or concept of the problem. So also may a partial success. Or new circumstances—change in budget resources, new directives from superiors, or a change in the political climate—change the constraints within which functionaries seek solutions.

The role of multiple participants in problem-solving, and policy-making (e.g., for CSEPP, federal, state, and local authorities, professional staff, stakeholders such as first responders, and the citizens to be protected by CSEPP), thus, must be understood in the context of ambiguity, confusion, complexity, and uncertainty. Although it is possible, and occasionally fruitful, to focus on a discrete decision or its implementation at a particular point in time, identify and assess “the” goals and objectives of multiple stakeholders and the actions taken by them in furtherance of those goals and objectives, and to offer “professional” (in contrast to “lay”) guidance, it should always be understood that the real world is more complex than can be known, that each step is a step toward becoming, not a final step in understanding. As Lindblom quotes (1990:275) a Swedish policy analyst, “As I see it, R&D must continue to be aimed at solving problems. What we have to eliminate is the belief—or rather, the expectation — that R&D will provide *the* solution to *the* problem” (italics in original).

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There are features of the American political landscape that make an understanding of decision making and implementation problematic. Federalism, separation of institutional powers, election and selection procedures, and the political history and traditions that have embellished and modified these notions play significant roles in defining problems and structuring how problems are

debated and solutions are found.³ The multiple avenues to authority (e.g., federal, state, and local authorities, and the checks and balances of executive, legislative, and judicial powers) provide a political roadmap that makes purposive action difficult to achieve due, in no small part, to the multiple opportunities for roadblocks and detours (Elazar 1966) or, to the need for joint action (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). Moreover, the bureaucratic democracy described by Freeman (1955) and modified by Yates (1982) provides a structure of subgovernments ill-equipped to respond to goals of both administrative efficiency and democracy. The tendencies to specialization (“guild professionalism”) and decentralization, characteristic of both the national bureaucracy and its sub-national counterparts, make the objective of integrated local planning (much less national planning) responsive to local concerns that much more difficult to achieve.



The politics of problem definition, argues Bosso (1994), is becoming increasingly important due to a number of major factors, including the erosion of traditional bases for policy support (e.g., political parties and regional loyalties) and the emergence of ideological anarchy in the post-Cold War world. The definition of a problem may, in many instances, have prior claim over policy alternatives as “the supreme instrument of power.” In addition to Schattschneider’s insistence on the importance of expanding the arena of conflict in determining policy outcomes (see also, Nelkin 1975 and Baumgartner 1989), research has approached problem definition from other perspectives as well. For instance, some have argued that problem definition is fundamentally a function of social constructions of reality (Berger and Luckmann 1967, Benjamin and Duvall 1991, Northcott 1992)—we tend to construct interpretations which may or may not be true in an absolute sense but help us understand things we experience and help us decide how to respond to those experiences (see also, Lindblom 1990). Others see problem definition as the formulation of “an ‘actionable’ statement of issue dynamics from which expenditures can be made, personnel can be deployed, and procedures can be developed that will reduce or eliminate the undesirable state of affairs without undue harmful consequences to related activities” (Guess and Farnham 1989:7); this view is more consistent with applied/technical analyses of policy formulation and implementation, in contrast with the more tacit forms of knowledge and understanding expressed by Lindblom (1990).

The struggle over problem definition is essentially political in that alternative causal understandings predispose certain kinds of policy solutions, foreclosing others, and directing the allocation of authority and resources to cope with a problem. Because stakeholders have their own interests, assumptions, and values that lead to particular favored definitions (Guess and Farnham 1989, Rochefort and Cobb 1994), problem definition can never be purely a technical enterprise. Participating stakeholders in a policy arena (in contrast to those who are impacted but “uninterested”) who make up the “community of operatives” (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) may base their problem definitions on professional, disciplinary, religious, economic, or ideological perspectives. Importantly, the roles played by experts may be central during the early days of policy controversy, particularly with respect to technological policies, before broader coalitions of support or opposition are brought together (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). In those later stages of policy debate, the political actor, the bureaucrat, and the expert (Wenk 1989), as well as those potentially impacted by a policy or decision, have vastly different views on the nature of the

³ Bosso (1994:193) notes “there is remarkably little straightforward discussion about how features like federalism, separation of institutional power, or distinct means of selection have had independent impacts on problem definition.”

problem, the weight of different “facts” in the presence of uncertainty, and alternative solutions and their consequences.

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
Stakeholders, including the diversity of stakeholders *within* an agency such as FEMA Headquarters, FEMA Region X, OEM, or Morrow or Umatilla County (and their subdivisions), might care about three different things (i.e., principles): (1) winning and securing as many objectives as possible for themselves; (2) getting a fair settlement, that is, "having things come out right;" and (3) having the problem resolved through a procedure they view as fair (Tyler 1990). The dominant (at least until recently) public choice paradigm (or family of models) in economic, decision, and political analysis, has argued that the first of these principles, self-interest, determine how people and their institutions view problems and make decisions, with emphases on cost/benefit analysis, expected or multi-attribute utility theory, and other similar approaches that begin with the assumptions that interests can be quantified and that each party to a problem seeks to maximize, optimize, or satisfice his or her interests. Theories of procedural and distributive justice, on the other hand, emphasize fair procedures or fair settlements, respectively -- that people and their institutions have dealt with one another fairly and should get what they deserve, however that is their

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⁴ Shklar (1990) argues that the sense of injustice is “the special kind of anger we feel when we are denied promised benefits and when we do not get what we believe to be our due... We hear the sense of injustice in the voices of Job and Jonah and Hesiod at the dawn of our literary history, and it still rings loud and true.” (p. 83)


stakeholders regarding how these objectives are interpreted. CSEPP also provides guidelines regarding the “what” that needs to be accomplished in order for these principal objectives to be achieved (i.e., the planning guidance). In the context of the alternative frameworks offered by Tyler and others, all three approaches to “wants” or “desires” are likely present, to a greater or lesser extent, among CSEPP stakeholders—there is evidence that some stakeholders want to get “as much as they can” to provide the needed protection, some stakeholders want the program to provide a fair share to their jurisdictions, and some, if not all, stakeholders want the process (principally the budget process) to be fair. The problem, if there is one, is in the details—the details of how these things are interpreted and the results of those interpretations.

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- Elected officials of involved off-post local governments;
- Local emergency management, police, fire, emergency medical services, and other key municipal and county agencies;
- State emergency management, environmental, public health, and public safety agency representatives;
- Chemical agent storage/disposal installation command and technical personnel;
- Volunteer agency representatives (e.g., American Red Cross);
- Community organization, school, hospital, and long-term care facility representatives; and
- Media representatives.

Organizing for CSEPP implementation (i.e., actions taken to implement the plan developed earlier) involves many of the same organizations that participate in the planning process. During this phase, however, the roles and responsibilities of these organizations have presumably been developed and agreed to among all participating organizations. Moreover, the roles and responsibilities for these organizations pertain to the basic functional areas of CSEPP—planning, budget, exercises, training, automation, public affairs, modeling/ meteorology, communications, and the like.



Assembling a staff dedicated to the development and implementation of CSEPP activities is critical to program implementation. The jobs to be accomplished in implementing CSEPP are many and varied; they include, but are not limited to, characterizing the hazard, identifying populations at risk, assessing vulnerability, identifying appropriate protective actions, developing plans, identifying decision-makers, procuring and installing communications capabilities (including alert and notification and warning systems), assuring public understanding of the threat and appropriate actions, testing and exercising preparedness capabilities, and garnering sufficient public support for the program to assure compliance.

Identifying, hiring, training, retaining, challenging, and rewarding the people responsible for accomplishing these tasks, and assuring their coordinated and integrated efforts on an on-going basis, are critical to accomplishing the job at hand. The development of a CSEPP *team*, imbued with common goals and objectives while allowing for and, in fact, encouraging individual innovation, enthusiasm, and entrepreneurship, is perhaps the most important activity that must be accomplished to implement CSEPP successfully.

Developing and maintaining a CSEPP team is similar to team-building associated with virtually any complex and multi-jurisdictional activity. However well thought-out an initial plan might be, plans evolve, people move in and out, priorities change, problems are encountered, solutions are identified and implemented, new plans and priorities develop. All is change. This accentuates the reality that team-building is a dynamic process and requires constant attention from all levels of management and staff. It also accentuates the need to identify and appreciate the different perspectives brought to bear on the problem by the various parties.

The following chapter describes how CSEPP has been organized and staffed for implementation in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties. That leads to a consideration of how CSEPP tasks [and particularly those associated with planning, budgeting, procurement,

communications (including warning and alert and notification systems), and public information/education] have been “assigned” to different organizations and staff members within these jurisdictions.

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Implementation of CSEPP by the State of Oregon is organized under the direction of the office of Oregon Emergency Management (OEM), located in the state capitol of Salem, which reports to the Intergovernmental Services Bureau of the Oregon State Police (OSP). The Pendleton Office of OEM, under the direction of Chris Brown, reports to the Director of OEM, Myra T. Lee. In addition to Lee and Brown, state CSEPP staff include a financial coordinator (Beauford Averette) and a systems analyst (Steven J. Hathaway), both of whom are located in Salem, and an assistant CSEPP manager (Kym Cazier), a communications coordinator (Ed Higuera), a training and exercises coordinator (Stanley Ross), a public information officer (Tom Worden), an administrative assistant (Margaret Fitch), all of whom are located in OEM offices in Pendleton, and a medical planner (Steve Myren) and a PPE coordinator (Brian Hopkins), both of whom are located in Boardman. In addition, the state has a full-time contractor (Larry Ross), located in Pendleton, in charge of maintenance of the alert and notification system (ANS). The medical planner and the PPE coordinator are employees of the Oregon Health Division (OHD) and report administratively to the Director of the Center for Environmental and Health Systems of the Oregon Health Division (Thomas W. Johnson).

This current configuration of the state CSEPP organization and staff is fairly recent. Until June, 1996, all OEM CSEPP staff were located in Salem. At that time, OEM reorganized and opened an eastern regional office in Pendleton to facilitate communications and coordination of CSEPP efforts in the UMCD area. Despite the relocation of the office in June, 1996, it was not until September, 1997, that a director for the eastern regional office of OEM and CSEPP Program Manager was filled in the Pendleton office (i.e., when Chris Brown was assigned the position and moved from Salem to Pendleton). At the time of the office relocation, only Fitch and Worden moved from Salem to Pendleton. Before Brown took the position in Pendleton, the CSEPP effort in Oregon was led by Dave Cassel and Fred Allen, both of whom were located in the Salem office of OEM.

OEM also eliminated the position of CSEPP policy advisor at the time that Oregon's CSEPP effort was relocated to Pendleton. That position was replaced, shortly after the move of the office to Pendleton, with the position of Assistant CSEPP manager. This position was recruited in late summer, 1998, and was filled by Kym Cazier, the former bi-county logistics coordinator for CSEPP.

It is important to note that CSEPP efforts by the State of Oregon have, until recently, been overseen on a routine basis by the Director of OEM.

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On-post emergency response activities at Umatilla Chemical Depot, as at all Army installations storing and/or disposing chemical agents and munitions, are governed by the Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 50-6, *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, which describes the Army's functions, responsibilities, organization, and procedures for responding to chemical events. This response effort includes some key off-post concerns such as public information, event assessment, emergency notification, and coordination of response activities. Staff at UMCD and state and local emergency response organizations must keep each other informed during the planning process to assure that each is familiar with their responsibilities and current plans.

In the context of CSEPP, according to the memorandum of understanding between the Department of the Army and FEMA signed on October 8, 1997, the Army has responsibility to:

- Until such time as a direct appropriation to FEMA is established for the purposes of accomplishing the objectives of the memorandum, provide an annual funding amount to FEMA at the beginning of each fiscal year that is based on the approved program Life Cycle Cost Estimate, adjusted for the actual Congressional appropriation.
- Provide technical support and expertise to assist FEMA in implementing off-post chemical agent emergency preparedness procedures, to include:
 - chemical agent emergency preparedness automation systems
 - meteorological expertise in atmospheric dispersion modeling and site-specific hazard assessments and analyses required for personal protection, collective protection, monitoring/ detection and decontamination equipment
 - expertise, training, and technical assistance, as requested and in coordination with FEMA, for emergency medical response to chemical agent incidents/accidents
 - chemical agent specific equipment and systems support, such as agent testing, personal protection, detection/monitoring, decontamination, modeling, analysis, mitigation, and risk analysis
- At FEMA's request provide technical assistance and support to FEMA in the development, review and/or conduct of training on chemical agent materiel characteristics and agent specific emergency response procedures.
- Conduct site-specific risk analyses, and provide the product in a form needed by FEMA, which will be used by FEMA and the Army in defining readiness and funding requirements for site-specific chemical agent emergency preparedness programs.
- Ensure that viable Chemical Accident/Incident Response Assistance (CAIRA) Plans are in place and are assessed in conjunction with FEMA assessments of off-post emergency response plans.


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According to the memorandum of understanding between the Department of the Army and FEMA signed on October 8, 1997, FEMA has responsibility to:

- Assume total authority, responsibility, and accountability for working with State and local governments to develop their off-post emergency preparedness for responding to chemical accidents or incidents at the eight chemical storage installations.
- Administer funds to the State and local governments to support off-post emergency response preparedness for the chemical stockpile as such funds may be appropriated by Congress, either through the Army or a direct appropriation to FEMA.
- Take the lead in supporting State and local government development of off-post emergency preparedness plans, including upgrading community response capabilities, and conducting necessary training.
- Prepare, develop, deliver, and evaluate the effectiveness of, training to State and local governments for planning, mitigation and emergency response as they apply to the chemical warfare materiel stockpile.

- Provide technical assistance to State and local governments in the development of site-specific emergency preparedness programs.
- Work closely with States to develop policies and procedures to assist States in developing and assessing readiness at each site as necessary.
- Provide emergency management assistance, liaison and functional expertise to the Army and State and local governments in integrating on-post/off-post emergency response.
- Maintain an updated series of interagency agreements which delineate respective federal, state, and local agency capabilities and responsibilities and define procedures for coordination and direction for emergency planning and response.
- Take the lead in developing public information and education programs while the Army provides the technical data and information necessary to construct accurate educational material concerning the chemical agents and their hazards, and information regarding appropriate actions to be taken by the general public in the event of an incident.

As CSEPP has been implemented to date, FEMA Headquarters has conducted these activities where a central, national, or unified scope is warranted, and regional offices of FEMA have conducted these activities where routine interactions with state and local emergency planning and response organizations and staff are warranted.



<i>Task</i>	FEMA HQ	FEMA Region X	UMCD (Depot)	State (Salem)	State (Pendleton)	Morrow County	Umatilla County	Bi-County
<i>Develop Overall Program Structure</i>								
Develop general plans and SOPs		x				x	x	
Develop exercise program		x			x			
Develop training program		x			x			
Develop public education program		x			x	x	x	
Develop public information program		x			x	x	x	
<i>Develop and Maintain Emergency Systems</i>								
Develop and maintain automation system	x	x		x				x
Develop and maintain EOC	x	x				x	x	
Develop and maintain command and control system	x	x				x	x	
Develop and maintain radio system	x	x			x			x
Develop and maintain telephone system	x	x			x			x
Develop and maintain warning systems	x	x			x			x
Develop and maintain JIC	x	x			x	x	x	
<i>Develop and Maintain Support Functions</i>								
Develop and maintain traffic and access control		x				x	x	
Develop and maintain transportation support		x				x	x	
Identify special populations		x				x	x	
Develop and maintain medical support		x			x			
Develop and maintain reception centers		x						x
Develop and maintain PPE system		x			x			
Develop and maintain decontamination capability		x			x			
Develop and maintain agent detection system		x			x			
Develop and maintain protective action decision process		x				x	x	
Develop and maintain pressurized shelters	x	x			x	x	x	
Develop and maintain enhanced shelters	x	x			x	x	x	
Develop and maintain expedient shelters	x	x			x	x	x	
Develop and maintain search and rescue operations		x				x	x	
<i>Conduct Emergency Operations</i>								
Activate EOC						x	x	
Make protective action decision						x	x	
Implement warning process			x			x	x	
Mobilize all emergency support functions					x	x	x	
Maintain communications					x			x
<i>Conduct Recovery Operations</i>								
Monitor environment								
Manage contaminated areas and resources								
Develop recovery decontamination process								
Develop recovery command and control authority								

- 11 schools have been equipped with over-pressurization systems to provide students and staff a safe haven during a chemical emergency

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- 62 operational warning sirens have been installed in Morrow and Umatilla Counties, on the UMCD, and in southern Benton County (Washington)
- 19 operational electronic warning signs have been installed for emergency traffic information
- Three school vans have been purchased for schools to evacuate students during an emergency
- 280 sets of protective clothing have been provided to emergency responders
- 11 mobile trailers have been equipped and sited in communities to decontaminate people who may become exposed to chemicals
- Eight area hospitals have been equipped to treat people during a chemical emergency
- State-of-the-art communications, with computerized emergency management systems, telephones, and tactical radios, have been installed to assist emergency response officials during emergencies
- 15,500 tone alert radios have been procured for dwellings in Morrow and Umatilla Counties, and arrangements are being made for their distribution and installation

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- More than 3,000 responders have completed chemical awareness, medical treatment or decontamination training in Oregon and Washington

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- Public information specialists continue to raise public awareness about chemical emergency protective actions with speaking engagements, Wally Wise visits, media interviews, and informational products [e.g., annual calendar with what to do instructions (Oregon counties), brochures, fliers, and videos).

Notwithstanding these impressive accomplishments, much still needs to be done, particularly in the areas of public information and working with municipalities and first responders. It will be essential that CSEPP managers and staff and elected officials pull together as a team to assure that these and other necessary activities are completed on time.

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accounts done at end of the month; thus, a project manager may think he/she has access to funds but does not if not requested for “draw” by the 12th of the month, because those funds may have been drawn to other accounts (interview with Beauford Averette, OEM, on November 12, 1998). This is a routine problem. Secondly, with changes in personnel, there is a loss of institutional memory and new staff have to be trained regarding CSEPP financing and the budget process. Thirdly, a number of the interviewees indicated that they had received little guidance from FEMA Region X regarding why budget requests had been denied or that justification provided for budget requests through the budget process had been misplaced. Finally, a number of interviewees expressed a concern about how much time was spent complying with the budget process and, thus, was not available for completion of substantive CSEPP tasks.

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A number of interviewees indicated that some of the difficulty in hiring and retaining competent staff was a function of significant salary and wage differentials between and among state and local CSEPP offices. Specifically, state employees receive a higher salary or wage than county employees, and Morrow County employees receive a higher salary or wage than Umatilla County employees. As a consequence of these wage and salary differentials, county emergency management staff have bid on and taken offers of employment from OEM, and Umatilla County employees are experiencing low morale related to their perceived worth. One of the interviewees suggested that if county wages were not competitive it might be advisable to obtain needed services through personal services contracts (interview with Louis Carlson, December 10, 1998).

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Many, if not most, of the CSEPP managers and staff and elected officials interviewed expressed concerns about the procurement of tone alert radios (TARs). Many of those persons recounted chronologies of events and involved offices and personnel that constituted manifestations of miscommunications, mistrust, and resultant low morale.

The procurement of TARs, although now apparently on course, became a lightning rod for much of the controversy surrounding CSEPP implementation over the last few years. Expressions of distrust by and among CSEPP managers and staff and elected leaders, questions regarding the technical competence of CSEPP personnel throughout the program (including FEMA Headquarters), communications breakdowns among CSEPP staff throughout the program, cultural differences among CSEPP personnel, taken together, created an environment in which it was perhaps impossible to develop and maintain any sense of teamwork and unity.

Despite these problems, a number of suggestions were made during the course of my interviews that could help to remedy the TARs procurement:

- Change the bi-county communications coordinator position to a single county (i.e., Umatilla County) communications coordinator
- Give Morrow County a coordinator for TARS, overpressurization, and communications


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Some people simply have not gotten along well with each other. Among other issues, people question each others’ motives, agendas, ethics, technical ability, personal ability, cultural

background, decision making style, and willingness to work with others. Any one of these concerns could constitute a threat to the ability to get the job completed. When taken together, these many dimensions of interpersonal relations may have the ability to derail such an effort entirely.

What appears to be lacking has been an absence of a vision that can be and is shared among all CSEPP staff and managers and elected officials. Without a vision it is extremely difficult to develop a team where members know their jobs, know about the other jobs, know the relationships among jobs, know the people who are performing those jobs, and can pull together.

Conditions have, however, actually improved somewhat in the recent past. As tasks are completed, as emergency preparedness equipment is procured and delivered, as events unfold that demonstrate the productiveness of working together (e.g., actually procuring the TARs and decontamination trailers), all members of the team appear to have become more willing to accept one another. Even the completion of the emergency operating center (EOC) in Pendleton and the movement of office and staff to that building holds open the possibility of enhanced communications and day-to-day interaction that could lead to a more consolidated and integrated team. Without the active support of managers and elected officials for such consolidation and integration, however, it is possible that such proximity could lead to worsened rather than improved relations.



Any effort lasting as long as CSEPP implementation has is likely to suffer from staff attrition. People change, their interests diverge, their needs evolve, and people move on. CSEPP implementation in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties has suffered all of these problems in varying degrees.

At the state level, the decision to locate an office of OEM in eastern Oregon and the implementation of that decision were vital to CSEPP implementation in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties. As long as virtually all state leadership and all of the state technical support were provided from Salem, it was virtually impossible for OEM to track the program effectively and to develop a working relationship with the counties. Personnel changeover at the state level had been a problem to that point (e.g., changes in state program leadership and accountability), and the continuing situation of having the state's automation function and budget/accounting function working out of Salem is less than optimal, although it may be the case that the budget/accounting work needs to be in daily contact with the rest of the state's financial system in Salem to allow that function to work effectively. In any case, it would be advisable for *all* state CSEPP functions and staff work out of and report directly to the state's CSEPP manager in Pendleton.

At the county level, Morrow County has enjoyed much more stability in personnel than has Umatilla County. As far as I could tell, this is likely a function of several factors including higher wage/salaries in Morrow County, a greater centralization of authority and responsibility in Morrow County, and differences in leadership style between the two counties.

Under conditions of attrition one looks for constancy. Who are the people who have lasted, who have weathered the storm, who have the institutional memory that is so vital to effective functioning in organizations? Have the "right" people lasted and provided an institutional memory that is functional to the organization, or have some members stayed longer than is "good" for the program?

When new staff members and managers are hired, it is essential that they are provided the opportunity to learn about the program. What is less clear is the value of learning about the dysfunctional aspects of CSEPP implementation in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties (and

in FEMA Headquarters and Region X) to date. It is likely futile, however, to attempt to filter events and history out of the learning curve, since much such information is gleaned informally from one's peers. What is a more valuable asset among CSEPP managers and staff and elected officials, as well as any new hires, is the ability to discriminate and filter information, keeping that which is useful and trying to understand the remainder in the context of which it is provided.

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The implementation of CSEPP in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties will continue regardless of any changes in organization or staffing. What may be more problematic is whether the current organization and staffing are adequate to meet the remaining challenges in a timely fashion—to meet the certification requirements anticipated to be imposed by the Governor of Oregon prior to his agreement to allow the disposal facility to conduct its test burn starting in April, 2000.

Regardless of which organizational approach and staffing changes are implemented, the most pressing needs for accomplishing specific CSEPP tasks (see Table 5.1) and meeting potential certification requirements, include the following:

- revise and update county emergency plans and implementing procedures for field operations and develop CSEPP response plans and implementing procedures for the communities which integrate with updated County plans,
- complete fielding of the Federal Emergency Management Information System (FEMIS),
- distribute all TARs and shelter-in-place kits,
- develop and implement comprehensive public information and public education programs,
- develop, implement, and maintain training and equipping for all emergency (i.e., first) responders, including medical preparedness planning and training and the creation of OSHA respiratory protection and decontamination, PPE and personal monitoring programs,
- implement and maintain tactical communications, and
- assure that all special populations in the IRZ are properly protected, including completion of all current and new overpressurization projects, if any.

All of these activities are required to be completed for CSEPP to reach a maintenance phase in Oregon. That is, following the completion of these activities, CSEPP in Oregon should be implemented completely except for continued maintenance of emergency systems and support functions (see Table 5.1).

This chapter identifies a number of plausible organizational concepts for the continued implementation of CSEPP in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties. Each is examined in terms of meeting required CSEPP tasks. In addition, implications for staffing needs are examined. The advantages and disadvantages of each strategy and staffing alternative are also discussed.

require the agreement of the elected leadership of both counties as well as a consensus determination of who would be the CSEPP program manager. Neither of these decisions would likely be forthcoming for a variety of reasons, as discussed below. A graphical representation of this arrangement is shown in Fig. 7.1.

In terms of management, it may be more effective to have the two county programs focused on a synchronized effort through a management structure that depicts overall activities. Because the elements of the program are identical in each county (although some, such as procurement styles, are currently addressed in somewhat different ways), a single manager could bring unity to program efforts and leadership and direction to the mix of county employees that would remain after consolidation. This approach might result in a more focused management of the program, enhanced coordination between the counties, greater consistency in program implementation and execution in the two counties, and a more efficient and effective use of resources. In addition, some elements of the budget process might be simplified (e.g., a single local budget proposal would be submitted for review by the State and review and approval through federal channels), although even those improvements might obtain only for a part of the overall budget process (i.e., State review and and federal review and approval); the budget process from the local perspective might actually be more complex if the budget proposal required simultaneous concurrence by the leadership of both counties.

Under this organizational arrangement, all of the activities to be completed to bring CSEPP to a maintenance phase could be completed. Unless, however, a strong leader and manager were selected, there is little likelihood that this approach would address successfully any or many of the implementation concerns identified in Chapter 6. In fact, unless chosen with the concurrence of most, if not all, existing CSEPP staff and managers, as well as elected officials, such a leader might actually delay CSEPP implementation, at least until some reasonable level of trust could be developed. There could be increased attrition of personnel, and interpersonal relations that have been improving recently could deteriorate. Moreover, this approach would require a resolution of the problem of wage and salary differentials, such as having all county CSEPP staff be the employees of one county or the other. This might be difficult for the elected leadership to accept (and justify to their voters); in addition, there could be significant unrest and uncertainty among CSEPP staff depending on which county's payroll they were hired under and paid.

This approach could also be problematic from the perspective of the State of Oregon. On the one hand, this approach would address some of the concerns expressed by their managers and staff regarding program effectiveness and coordination. Moreover, the State would be required to "negotiate" with only one local CSEPP manager (i.e., leaving the balancing of resource requirements and implementation at the local level). On the other hand, this asset could be considered a liability since the State would actually lose flexibility in terms of its ability to encourage some behaviors over others.

In terms of staffing requirements, this approach might result in some consolidation of staffing at the county level (e.g., only one public information officer and one office manager might be required), but other positions might not be consolidated due to increasing staff responsibilities in the near term (e.g., maintaining the emergency response data base would likely require two positions). Even in the case of the public information positions, it may well be the case that both positions would still be needed given the criticality of public information and education regarding CSEPP in the near term. It is assumed, for the present, that the composition of the State CSEPP staff would remain as is.

Under this approach the State, specifically the eastern regional office of OEM in Pendleton, would assume management and implementation responsibility for CSEPP in consultation and coordination with the elected officials of Morrow and Umatilla Counties (see Fig. 7.2). As such, all current county CSEPP staff would be converted to state service. Another alternative would involve a combination of staffing and contracting. If the current county CSEPP staff were to become state employees, it would be desirable for them to be term employees, if possible, to avoid an employment problem at the conclusion of the program.


At present, the State only has direct management responsibility for the alert and notification system (sirens and reader boards and the infrastructure that supports them, and coordination of the radio system), a result of the first years of the CSEPP effort when the counties lacked the technical support to develop a system on their own. By statute, however, the State is the conduit for FEMA/Army funds but has limited control over the funds after they are passed down to the counties. For example, the State can “recommend” approval or disapproval of county requests, but does not directly control the outcome.

This approach would require the creation of a framework that would provide the Counties with a voice in collaborative decision making. This is made possible by Oregon statute which indicates that the counties may *delegate* administrative or operative authority for emergency management functions but would retain overall responsibility for the emergency management system. However, and as a modification of the concept depicted in Fig. 7.2, local influence could be preserved by assigning a CSEPP staff person, under the direction of the State CSEPP manager in Pendleton, to serve as a liaison with local government entities. All of the CSEPP employees (i.e., communications, public information, ADP, hazard analysts, administrative support, area manager, et al) would work under the direction of the State CSEPP manager in Pendleton and would prepare and submit work plans to be integrated into a single CSEPP management plan. This concept would retain all current State CSEPP staff.

As a modification to the concept depicted in Fig. 7.2, an agreement with the Morrow County Court, the Umatilla Board of Commissioners and the Director of OEM (representing the Governor’s Office) could create a combined “CSEPP Board” (perhaps as a modification to the integrated process team (IPT) to meet regularly to establish policy direction for the total CSEPP staff, and to coordinate the implementation of CSEPP requirements. Under the Board’s direction the State CSEPP manager would be responsible for hiring staff for the overall CSEPP effort. The elected officials of the Counties would retain final decision making power on all protective action decisions in the event of an emergency.

This approach should improve the prospects for completing CSEPP implementation (i.e., getting to a maintenance phase) by virtue of the fact that a single office would be accountable for implementation of the program. Of course, the viability of this approach would be contingent on the acceptability of the approach to local stakeholders, including the counties’ elected officials. It would be very important that the State CSEPP manager, as *the* CSEPP manager for Oregon and for the counties, would have the active cooperation of all CSEPP staff as well as that of the elected officials.

The effect of this approach on resolving concerns identified in Chapter 6 would appear to be salutary if the CSEPP manager is able to overcome the concerns related to history and interpersonal relations. Centralizing the CSEPP office should reduce the number of iterations required during the budget process, and having all CSEPP staff members as state employees should eliminate the problems created by wage and salary differentials and should also reduce problems of attrition. Whether any of the current county CSEPP staff would elect to resign their



- = formal line of authority
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- = formal line of governmental jurisdictions
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positions (i.e., refuse to become State employees) is not known but appears unlikely since State salary levels are higher than county salary levels. Again, much would depend on the manager's ability to develop and maintain the trust of the staff.

This approach could result in the largest changes in staffing levels *if* the staff assignments are modified to eliminate the function of oversight and *if* potential reductions of effort expended on the budget process could be realized. Thus, for example, the time spent in multiple iterations and reviews of budget proposals could be reduced by eliminating an entire tier of reviews (by functional experts), although additional efforts on the part of the CSEPP manager, or assistant CSEPP manager, might be required to integrate the budget request. Moreover, the time currently spent by State CSEPP staff overseeing the work of their County counterparts could be significantly reduced, since the same people would now be responsible for their own actions rather than overseeing the efforts of others. These benefits would not be uniform for all program elements (see below).




A third management alternative is a hybrid of the previous two—retain Morrow County's leadership of CSEPP implementation in Morrow County but empower the State CSEPP manager to lead CSEPP implementation in Umatilla County as well as conduct its current state CSEPP operations (see Fig. 7.3). This option was suggested by various interviewees in recognition of the differences in CSEPP implementation in the two Counties—Morrow County, for a variety of reasons, is much farther ahead in implementing CSEPP than Umatilla County.

This approach would allow implementation in Morrow County to proceed on its present course and assign responsibility for implementation in Umatilla County to the State CSEPP manager, with a corresponding transfer of Umatilla County CSEPP staff to the state payroll (e.g., as term employees). This approach would have the advantage of letting Morrow County proceed with its timely implementation of the remainder of the program and provide Umatilla County with the leadership (currently provided only on a part-time basis by the payroll (e.g., as term employees)). This approach would have the advantage of letting Morrow County proceed with its timely implementation of the remainder of the program and provide Umatilla County with the leadership (currently provided only on a part-time basis by the Director of the Department of Resource Services and Development and the Director of Emergency Operations) and structure needed to accelerate program implementation in Umatilla County.

Under this organizational arrangement, all of the activities to be completed to bring CSEPP to a maintenance phase could be completed (and may have a better chance of completion by the certification deadline of April, 2000, than other organizational arrangements). Some of the concerns identified in Chapter 6 might be mitigated by adopting and implementing this approach, but others might be exacerbated. For instance, some of the duplicative effort currently associated with the budget process for Umatilla County budget requests might be avoided, but the problem associated with salary and wage differentials might actually become worse as Umatilla County employees moved to the higher State government salary scale (i.e., Morrow County employees might feel they were being treated unfairly). This approach could also have some impacts on concerns related to interpersonal relations, as the staff, managers, and elected officials sorted out their understanding and level of comfort with this approach.

As with the State CSEPP management concept, this approach would require the creation of a framework that would provide the Umatilla County with a voice in collaborative decision making with the State on issues affecting Umatilla County. However, and as a modification of the concept depicted in Fig. 7.3, local influence could be preserved by assigning a CSEPP staff



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person, under the direction of the State CSEPP manager in Pendleton, to serve as a liaison with Umatilla County and its communities. All of the CSEPP employees (i.e., current State employees and employees transferring from the Umatilla County payroll) would work under the direction of the State CSEPP manager in Pendleton. The State CSEPP manager would be responsible for preparing work plans and budgets for Umatilla County CSEPP implementation and State CSEPP implementation and for reviewing Morrow County plans and budget requests.

This approach could result in some reduction in staffing levels *if* the State staff assignments are modified to eliminate the function of oversight of Umatilla County implementation (since the State CSEPP manager's office would itself be responsible for implementation) and *if* potential reductions of effort expended on the budget process could be realized. Thus, for example, the time spent in multiple iterations and reviews of budget proposals could be reduced by eliminating an entire tier of reviews for budget requests for CSEPP implementation in Umatilla County (by functional experts), although additional efforts on the part of the CSEPP manager, or assistant CSEPP manager, might be required to integrate the budget requests. Moreover, the time currently spent by State CSEPP staff overseeing the work of their Umatilla County counterparts could be reduced, since the same people would now be responsible for their own actions rather than overseeing the efforts of others. These benefits would not be uniform for all program elements (see below).



It is possible to identify the functions and tasks that remain to be completed to bring Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties to a maintenance phase for CSEPP and those that will have to be in a state of readiness in the event that an accidental release of chemical agent from UMCD occurs. This list of functions and tasks essentially comprises all activities that must be completed to satisfy the functions identified in the planning guidance (DA/FEMA 1996) or achieve certification by the Governor of Oregon (i.e., the certification matrix). The remainder of this chapter identifies those tasks and attempts to identify the staff capabilities that are needed to accomplish those tasks.

To bring CSEPP to a stage of maintenance, Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties need to complete development of the overall program structure, development of all emergency systems, and development of all support functions, as enumerated in the first three parts of Table 5.1. With respect to these tasks, a number of items need to be updated or upgraded, as shown in Table 7.2.

These tasks will be accomplished by staff possessing a number of generic specialties, including managers, budget and administrative support, hazard and resource analysts, communications specialists, public information/education specialists, logistics specialists, automation and network specialists, medical preparedness and PPE specialists, and a training and exercise specialist (see Table 7.1 for the current composition of CSEPP-funded staff). One specialty that is conspicuously absent from the current composition, particularly in light of current needs, is planning. Although several of the current staff in Morrow and Umatilla Counties have met planning needs as they have emerged, it is likely that current demands for planning activity (e.g., updating plans and implementing procedures at the county level and supporting community-level planning, as needed) cannot be met by the existing staff. As discussed below, it may be possible to re-assign some of the existing staff to complete these assignments or to procure planning support through contracting. The remainder of the discussion of staff positions needed to reach the maintenance phase are addressed in the context of generic specialties.

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Managers. There are currently five persons occupying management positions in CSEPP in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties. Three of these people, accounting for 2.25 FTEs, are employed by OEM—the director of OEM in Salem (0.25 FTE), the State CSEPP Manager in Pendleton (1.00 FTE), and the Assistant State CSEPP Manager in Pendleton (1.00 FTE). Morrow County’s CSEPP Manager (0.80 FTE) and Umatilla County’s Director of Resource Services and Development (0.25 FTE) account for 1.05 FTEs. Umatilla County had had a CSEPP Manager (1.00 FTE), but the individual occupying that position resigned, and the position has not been filled; Umatilla County’s Emergency Management Operations Supervisor currently assists the Director of Resource Services and Development in co-managing CSEPP in Umatilla County, but his participation is not funded by CSEPP.

At face value, the level of support for management in OEM appears excessive, and that for Umatilla County is inadequate. However, it is understood that support for the Director of OEM will be eliminated in the near future (to be consistent with funding for other CSEPP states). The State’s Assistant Manager focuses on fiscal, budgetary issues and policy, and assistance to the State CSEPP Manager with planning issues and project management. The Assistant Manager also is responsible for working with the State’s CSEPP fiscal coordinator (stationed in Salem) and FEMA Region X to facilitate the timely receipt of funds for CSEPP operations. The individual occupying the Assistant Manager’s position also has extensive experience with CSEPP staff and managers and elected officials in the Counties and possesses as much, or more, institutional knowledge of the program as any individual in the program.

The CSEPP Manager position in Umatilla County definitely needs to be filled. The Director of Resource Services and Development simply does not have the time available to focus on CSEPP in light of his other responsibilities. In addition, an individual with significant leadership skills and an ability to work with disparate staff and interests is needed to fill this position. This position might be filled as a part-time position (perhaps combined with additional work scope, such as planning), retaining the 0.25 FTE support for the Director of Resource Services and Development to facilitate transitioning and integration within Umatilla County.


No change is recommended for the management position in Morrow County.

Budget and Administrative Support □ There are currently four persons occupying budget and administrative support positions in CSEPP in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties. Two of these people, accounting for 1.5 FTEs, work for OEM—the budget/fiscal coordinator stationed in Salem (budgeted at 0.5 FTE) and an administrative assistant/office manager (at 1.0 FTE) stationed in Pendleton. The other two people, accounting for 1.0 FTE each, are office managers affiliated with Morrow and Umatilla Counties.

The only change recommended for these positions is either upgrading the budget/fiscal coordinator position to a full-time position (with some modification of job tasks—see below)— and relocating the position to Pendleton or requiring routine and regular travel by the budget/fiscal coordinator to eastern Oregon to work with OEM staff in Pendleton and County CSEPP managers and staff in Morrow and Umatilla Counties. The problems associated with budget and fiscal matters have become a major issues associated with CSEPP implementation (see Chapter 6) and require focused attention. If the position is upgraded to a full-time position (to include support for all contracting activities), it might be possible to reduce or eliminate the budget/fiscal responsibilities of the State’s Assistant CSEPP Manager (see above) and have the



Task	Agency [staff person(s)] with primary responsibility	Principal support agency (staff position)	Agency(ies), institutions or populations targeted for task
Create and maintain OSHA respiratory protection program	• Oregon Health Division (Hopkins)		• First responders
Create and maintain OSHA decontamination program	• Oregon Health Division (Hopkins)		• First responders
Create and maintain PPE program	• Oregon Health Division (Hopkins)		• First responders
Create and maintain personal monitoring program	• Oregon Health Division (Hopkins)		• First responders
Maintain command and control system (Incident Command system)	• Morrow County (Beard) • Umatilla County (Olson)	• UMCD • OEM (Brown)	• All emergency responders
Revise local/county implementing procedures for field operations based on the above programs and plans	• Morrow County (planner) • Umatilla County (planner)	• Morrow County (Beard, Doherty) • Umatilla County (Olson, Bishop)	• First responders • Public
Maintain exercise and training programs (including training of first responders for all respiratory protection, decontamination, PPE, and monitoring programs)	• OEM (Ross) • OHD (Hopkins and Myren)		• First responders • Public
Develop and implement aggressive public education and information programs,	• Morrow County (Knoll) • Umatilla County (Capps)	• OEM (Worden)	• Public • Print and electronic media
Maintain automation system, including fielding of FEMIS	• Bi-County (Lonai)	• OEM (Hathaway) • Morrow County (Doherty) • Umatilla County (Bishop)	• Decision makers • First responders
Complete upgrade of Morrow County EOC and maintain Morrow and Umatilla County EOCs	• Morrow County (Beard) • Umatilla County (Olson)		• Decision makers • CSEPP managers and staff
Develop and maintain tactical radio and communications systems	• OEM (Higuera)	• Bi-County (Estes)	• Decision makers and first responders
Maintain warning systems			
Sirens and reader boards	• OEM (Higuera)	• Contractor (Ross)	• Public
TARs	• Bi-County (Estes)		• Public
Maintain Joint Information Center (JIC)	• OEM (Worden)	• Morrow County (Knoll) • Umatilla County (Capps)	• Print and electronic media • Public



Task	Agency [staff person(s)] with primary responsibility	Principal support agency (staff position)	Agency(ies), institutions or populations targeted for task
Maintain traffic and access control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OEM (?) • Morrow County (?) • Umatilla County (?) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morrow County law enforcement • Umatilla County law enforcement • State of Oregon law enforcement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public
Maintain transportation support (i.e., for evacuation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morrow County (Bergstrom) • Umatilla County (Bishop) • State of Oregon (?) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Any institutions to be evacuated (e.g., schools) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Populations designated to be evacuated in event of a release
Complete identification of special populations (e.g., some pre-school daycare centers, Head Start centers, have only recently been identified)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morrow County (planner) • Umatilla County (planner) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutions hosting special populations in IRZ and PAZ (e.g., schools, daycare centers, hospitals, nursing homes) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clients of special population facilities
Maintain reception centers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contractor (American Red Cross - Ruttan) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OEM (Brown) • Morrow County (Beard) • Umatilla County (Olson) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Potential users of reception centers
Complete overpressurization projects (including any new special population centers identified to need overpressurization)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morrow County (Beard) • Umatilla County (Olson) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overpressurization contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clients/users of overpressurized facilities
Distribute all shelter-in-place kits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morrow County (Beard) • Umatilla County (Howard) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents/users of occupied buildings in IRZ
Maintain the protective action decision process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OEM (Brown) • Morrow County (Beard) • Umatilla County (Olson) • UMCD (Commander) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morrow County Judge and Board of County Commissioners • Umatilla County Board of Commissioners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public

Assistant CSEPP Manager assume responsibility for coordinating and integrating planning (e.g., the updating and upgrading of response plans in the Counties and in communities) and providing policy support and guidance to the public education and information tasks; both of these tasks (i.e., planning and public education/information) will require significant attention to bring the program to completion and may justify such a re-assignment of duties.

In addition to having the OEM budget/fiscal coordinator work routinely and regularly with OEM and County staff in eastern Oregon, it may be prudent to have appropriate FEMA Region X staff travel to eastern Oregon on a regular basis to work out fiscal and budgetary problems.

Hazard and Resource Analysis. Each county employs an individual to analyze hazards posed by the chemical stockpile at UMCD and develop and maintain resource and response data associated with emergency planning and response in Morrow and Umatilla Counties. These individuals have additional duties that vary somewhat. For instance, for Morrow County, this person is assigned responsibility to coordinate automation system testing and operational maintenance and to support FEMIS development and prepare a plan for its fielding; for Umatilla County, this individual is to assist the EOC director during exercises and emergencies. These individuals work directly with the Bi-County automation specialist.

No change is recommended regarding these two positions. It is likely, however, that these individuals will need some assistance (e.g., collection of updated data and information regarding resources and any new relevant implementing procedures) from planning staff if such positions are added to the current county complement of CSEPP staff.

Communications. At present there is a State Communications Coordinator, a full time state contract telecommunications technician working under the state Communications Coordinator, and a Bi-County Communications Coordinator who is responsible for implementing and integrating all CSEPP emergency communications in Morrow and Umatilla Counties and supporting the operation of the CSEPP alert and notification system; this person also had the lead role in developing the procurement of the TARs for Morrow and Umatilla County.

With the completion of the tactical radio system and the imminent completion of the TAR system, all of the communications system procurement and construction will be completed. The positions called for would then be essentially maintenance in nature with expertise in system management and maintenance, and field technical experience. These maintenance tasks are not likely to be trivial, to say the least. The major infrastructure for the alert and notification system (i.e., the sirens and reader boards) has been in place for some time, and yet the full time contract technician is still needed. After the TARs have been procured and distributed, it is likely to be necessary to retain an individual who can track and maintain the TAR units, distribute additional TAR units as they are needed, and retire TAR units as they are not needed or become unserviceable.⁸ TAR maintenance may not require a full-time position, but the retained individual will have to have many, if not most, of the same qualifications as the current Bi-County Communications Coordinator; if a full-time Bi-County Communications Coordinator is not needed, it may be that the individual occupying that position can have that position modified to include some emergency planning and support responsibilities (particularly since the individual already has some institutional knowledge of CSEPP in Morrow and Umatilla Counties) and/or automation system support.

Given the above rationale, there is also some question as to whether a full-time State Communications Coordinator is needed. As such, it may be useful to expand the duties of the State

⁸ This may be one of the functions of the logistics coordinator recently hired by Umatilla County. If this is the case, then the Bi-County Communications Coordinator can assume additional duties including support for planning or automation systems.

Communications Coordinator to include additional duties relevant to the individual's capabilities (e.g., supporting automation system maintenance under the direction of the State system analyst/administrator stationed in Salem).

Public Information/Education. There are currently three persons, accounting for 3.00 FTEs, occupying public information/education positions in CSEPP in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties. One of these people works for OEM in the Pendleton office, and the other two work for Morrow and Umatilla Counties.

Despite significant efforts and accomplishments during CSEPP's implementation in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties, public information and education remains, perhaps, the single most important issue to address and work during the remainder of the program. Even with the most advanced and capable planning, equipment, warning, and training, little may be achieved if the public is not familiar with and prepared to take the protective actions identified by planners and recommended by decision makers at the time of an accidental release of chemical agent.

There are several tasks that must be accomplished or, in many cases, re-accomplished, in the areas of public information and education in the next year or so (i.e., prior to reaching a maintenance phase or being certified by Oregon's Governor):

- the public must be re-informed and re-educated about the actions they should take in the event of an accidental release at UMCD;
- the public must understand the roles that various agencies and offices will take in the event of an accidental release at UMCD, including specifically
 - elected officials,
 - school officials (and other caretakers of special populations),
 - first responders,
 - CSEPP staff, and
 - communities outside the IRZ/PAZ (i.e., mass care or reception centers);
- the public must understand how emergency preparedness works—the logic of CSEPP protective actions and how they work together (e.g., shelter-in-place can and will work better than evacuation for some people, evacuation can and will work better than shelter-in-place for other populations, why these statements are true, and how each protective action would work and what could happen to make each protective action not work); and
- the public must have sufficient confidence in the planning process, CSEPP staff and managers, and their elected officials to believe the information they receive and be willing to take action based on that trust.

It must be emphasized that, for the most part, these tasks are a continuation of current efforts. They do, however, require a re-dedication to meet the original CSEPP objective of *community-based planning and preparedness*. This objective can be met by many of the same measures currently being implemented by CSEPP's public information staff members (e.g., calendars, speaking engagements, first responder training, and videos) but is likely to require a somewhat different focus in terms of media relations. Specifically, less attention needs to be paid to the public relations aspect of public information and public education and more to simply getting the CSEPP jobs done—getting the jobs done should, at least in the mid- to long-term, take care of the public relations aspects of CSEPP.

The current job descriptions of the CSEPP public information staff do not need significant modification but they may need some modification in terms of proportionality of tasks. That is, the current descriptions identify a reasonable range of activities for the public information/education staff but may err on the side of too much emphasis on what appears to be media manipulation (e.g., “handling media relations”, “training others in media relations”, “providing counsel to decision makers on public affairs and public policy issues”) with concomitant insufficient emphasis on actually providing information and education to the public, including special populations.

This perception of a focus on media manipulation (rather than public information and education) is partly a result of OEM and the two counties having their own public information and education staff members, each with a somewhat different approach to accomplishing their common tasks. Each staff member reviews media reports on CSEPP accomplishments (or lack thereof), articulates those reports to his or her supervisor, consults with his or her supervisor, prepares strategies for dealing with those reports, and implements those strategies. What is almost left out, except for the dedication of at least some of the public information and education staff, are the jobs of public information and education.

This perception of an over-emphasis on media relations may be a consequence, in large part, of supervisory bias and desires to have their programs appear in the best light possible. Although this desire is understandable, it is not necessarily conducive to getting the job done. What is needed to “correct” this bias is guidance, whose development is, perhaps, led by FEMA Region X but developed consensually among OEM and Morrow and Umatilla Counties, that would develop a unified and integrated public information and education strategy, with action items assigned to each staff member, office, and jurisdiction.

This strategy would de-emphasize public affairs (i.e., advise management concerning outstanding issues, prepare written briefings and other supporting materials, consulting routinely with the print and electronic media about current events) and re-emphasize the objectives of public education and information.

This change in philosophical approach is not meant to eliminate OEM’s or the Counties’ abilities to be responsive to media or legislative or congressional inquiries but, rather, to shift the program from being reactive to the media (and the State Legislature and Congress) to being proactive in the realm of public information and education.

Given the above discussion, it is premature to recommend any change in support to public information and education staffing levels. That determination, if one is made, should be made after a unified and integrated strategy is developed. It is my suspicion, given the scale and scope of jobs yet to be completed, that the current staffing level for public information and education is appropriate (and might, in fact, require additional resources). Any requirement for additional support in this area might be well served through a personal services contract with an appropriate firm or agency.

Logistics. There is currently (as of July 1, 1999) one person, accounting for 1.00 FTE, occupying a CSEPP-funded logistics position Umatilla County. That position had previously been a Bi-County position (as a Umatilla County employee) with responsibility to identify the logistic management requirements for the TARs and collective protection sheltering (overpressurization projects) and implement additional resource requirements for Morrow and Umatilla Counties CSEPP preparedness, response, recovery and re-entry operations. The individual occupying this Bi-County position resigned in 1998 to take a CSEPP-funded position with OEM, and the position was not re-filled until this past July (and was filled as a Umatilla County position rather than as a Bi-County position).

It is not clear exactly what the current requirements of this position are. Previously this position had included TARs distribution, but that task has now been assumed by FEMA Region X and is under active procurement. Moreover, most of the overpressurization projects have now been completed (and only a few, if any, additional projects are likely to be identified). If this position is intended to assume responsibility for programming new TARs, replacing TARs and issuing new TARs to an expanding population, and overseeing the maintenance of the TAR units in place, then some of the tasks assumed for the Bi-County Communications Coordinator (see above) might be diminished. This position might also be responsible for maintaining and/or tracking other protective equipment, such as PPEs, shelter-in-place kits, and the like.

Other than reassigning this position to be a Bi-County position (for programming, replacing, and maintaining TAR units and maintaining and/or tracking other protective equipment), I have no recommendations regarding staffing needs for this position.

Automation. There are currently two persons, accounting for 2.00 FTEs, occupying automation positions in CSEPP in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties. One of these people works for OEM in the Salem office, and the other individual works, as a Bi-County automation specialist for Morrow and Umatilla Counties (as an employee of Umatilla County).

The OEM employee is a full time systems analyst/network administrator who provides maintenance and system control for the wide area and local area networks that carry data to all of the Oregon CSEPP EOCs. This position is, in part, a historical legacy or artifact of OEM's participation in the development of IEMIS, SPOCC, IBS, and now FEMIS. In fact, the individual occupying this position reported that he spends approximately 75% (i.e., rather than 100%) of his time directly on CSEPP issues, although his other responsibilities (e.g., enhanced 9-1-1 and office integration of systems and networks) are also useful to CSEPP. The individual occupying the OEM automation position interacts routinely and frequently with the individual occupying the Bi-County automation position, although most, if not all, of those interactions are conducted telephonically/electronically. The OEM employee noted that OEM lacks technical support for FEMIS implementation and maintenance.

The Bi-County employee is a system analyst who assists both counties with automation issues, including FEMIS and GIS, and assures the accuracy and integrity of the systems. The incumbent is also responsible for providing training and user support to new and existing staff in using the systems or other software applications. The incumbent's office location in Umatilla County has meant that his availability to assist Morrow County staff has been somewhat limited.

The continuing implementation of CSEPP in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties definitely needs the expertise of a systems analyst/network administrator. It is not certain that the tasks to be completed (and systems and networks to be maintained) require two full-time positions. If any changes are to be made regarding these staff positions, it would be advisable to re-locate the OEM position from Salem to Pendleton to be of more use to system and network users in the field or, at a minimum, assure sufficient time in the field to provide such assistance. In addition, it might be advisable to provide a separate automation position (or part of a position) to Morrow County to assure support to automation issues in Morrow County. Assuming that the current Bi-County system analyst continues to support Umatilla County, it might be possible to provide support to Morrow County and to OEM in Pendleton (rather than attempting to re-locate the employee from Salem) through a personal services contract, but it may well be the case that computer science, as a field, is in high enough demand that such an approach may not be feasible. Such a contractor would need to have working knowledge about the as-built system.

FEMIS fielding, etc.) can be modified to focus purely on maintenance of these items. Other functions, however, such as public education and information, will continue to require a concerted level of effort to maintain public awareness of the program and assurance of the public's ability to take the appropriate protective action when needed.

Once CSEPP in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties has reached a maintenance phase (defined operationally, perhaps, by receiving gubernatorial certification), it would be appropriate to review staff needs and requirements to assure the provision of the appropriate number and mix of staff capabilities.

or has the requisite skills to accomplish the job), any one of which would sabotage the overall CSEPP effort; at a different point in time during the program’s implementation, such an individual might have been identified, but there is currently no such individual.

The second approach—State CSEPP management—is also flawed, principally because emergency management is basically (and by statute) a local government obligation. The counties are the jurisdiction of the government legally charged with the alert, notification and emergency response for the protection of the citizens in the vicinity of UMCD. The counties are responsible for procuring and fielding CSEPP response equipment, developing and coordinating response plans and directing response operations. The counties, and specifically the elected officials of the counties, are responsible for making the protective action decisions at the time of an accidental release. The State of Oregon (and FEMA Region X) can and must play important roles in CSEPP implementation, but they are supporting roles. The State CSEPP management approach might employ a “CSEPP Board” (composed of the Director of OEM, the Morrow County Court, and the Umatilla Board of Commissioners), as a modification of the IPT, as a means of consultation during program implementation, but the State CSEPP manager would be responsible for implementation. This approach is complicated by the fact that the Counties’ elected officials would retain final decision making power and authority for protective actions decisions in the event of an emergency; this responsibility (or liability) might make the acceptability of this approach questionable from the perspective of the elected officials.

The third organizational approach—State and Morrow County CSEPP management—was offered as a hybrid of the other two alternatives to recognize the reasonably stable and active management of CSEPP experienced in Morrow County but the current absence of viable management in Umatilla County. This approach suffers many of the liabilities associated with the second alternative, at least in terms of CSEPP implementation in Umatilla County. It was considered, however, because of the difficulties encountered in and by Umatilla County in implementing CSEPP.

The “best” approach is one that preserves the appropriate distribution of power, authority, and responsibility. The program was always intended to be community-based in recognition of the statutory responsibilities of local government to provide for the health and welfare (and protection) of its citizens and in recognition that a community-based program was more likely to be accepted (and learned) by local citizens and effective than one “imposed” from above (i.e., whether the State, FEMA, of the Army). Morrow County has an organization that works for Morrow County. If Umatilla County could identify and authorize a CSEPP manager who could create and lead the Umatilla County effort at a comparable level of effectiveness and efficiency, that would be the preferred approach. If, however, Umatilla County cannot do this (in the remaining time available), then the State and Morrow County CSEPP management approach, with active consultation with the elected leadership of Umatilla County, would be preferred.

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The investigation and analysis of staff positions in Oregon and Morrow and Umatilla Counties funded by CSEPP revealed a hard-working and dedicated staff who are, to a person, intent on doing the best job that can be done. In light of tasks to be accomplished to reach maintenance, however, a number of staff changes might be made to enhance that possibility.

These changes include some fairly substantial changes and some that are less so. The former category includes:

- elimination of support for the OEM Director (to be consistent with CSEPP implementation in other states),
- provision of support for planning that is needed to update and upgrade implementing procedures,
- hiring a CSEPP manager for Umatilla County (if the current organizational approach is maintained), and
- assuring there is sufficient support to implement a concerted public education and information program.

The other changes include:

- moving the OEM staff positions based in Salem to Pendleton (or increase substantially the amount of time people holding these positions spend in the field),
- reassigning the Umatilla County Logistics Coordinator to be a Bi-County position supporting both counties in managing emergency preparedness and response resources (e.g., TAR units, PPE, and shelter-in-place kits),
- reducing the communications coordination responsibilities of both the OEM and Bi-County positions to one-half time but amending the job descriptions to allow the individuals holding those positions to support other aspects of the program,
- reassigning the budget/fiscal coordination tasks of the State Assistant CSEPP Manager to the State fiscal coordinator (and make that position full time), and
- assign responsibility for coordinating and guiding state and county planning and public education/information activities to the State Assistant CSEPP Manager.

Some of these changes might be accomplished with contractor assistance. In addition to maintaining the current contracts for a telecommunications technician to maintain the alert and notification system and for support for reception center planning and preparedness, these could include providing support to an expansion of the public information and public education functions, providing support to automation systems support (instead of retaining or moving the OEM employee currently based in Salem), assuming responsibility for coordination of training and exercise activities, and providing planning support for Morrow and Umatilla Counties.

Regardless of any staff changes that might be made, it is important to recognize that virtually all CSEPP-funded staff and managers need to be expert in their own positions but capable in all of them. There will be times, particularly given the relatively brief period of time available to reach CSEPP maintenance, that any given staff position will be under-staffed and will require the support and help of other staff and managers. If all CSEPP staff and managers (and elected officials) are members of the same team, that is not an unreasonable expectation or condition. If, however, there is disagreement and concern over how the program is being implemented (and by whom, with how many resources, and to accomplish what objective), implementation will be problematic.



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<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Date of interview</i>
<i>Policy positions (not funded by CSEPP)</i>		
Myra Thompson Lee	Director, Office of Emergency Management (OEM), Department of State Police	November 12, 1998
Thomas W. Johnson	Director, Center for Environmental and Health Systems, Oregon Health Division	November 12, 1998
Dennis Doherty	Chairman, Umatilla County Board of Commissioners	December 8, 1998
Terry Tallman	Morrow County Judge	December 9, 1998
Louis Carlson	Morrow County Judge	December 9, 1998
Bill Hansell	Umatilla County Board of Commissioners	January 4, 1999
<i>State CSEPP positions</i>		
Chris E. Brown	CSEPP Manager, Eastern Region OEM (Pendleton)	December 7, 1998
Beauford Averette	CSEPP Financial Coordinator, OEM (Salem)	November 12, 1998
Steven J. Hathaway	CSEPP Systems Analyst, OEM (Salem)	November 12, 1998
Kym Cazier	Assistant CSEPP Manager, Eastern Region OEM	December 7, 1998
Ed Higuera	CSEPP Communications Coordinator, Eastern Region OEM	December 7, 1998
Larry Ross	Contractor (ANS maintenance), Eastern Region OEM	December 7, 1998
Stanley Ross	CSEPP Exercise & Training Coordinator, Eastern Region OEM	December 7, 1998
Steve Myren	Medical Planner, Oregon Health Division (Boardman)	December 7, 1998
Margaret Fitch	CSEPP Administrative Assistant, Eastern Region OEM	December 11, 1998
Tom Worden	CSEPP Public Information Officer, Eastern Region OEM	December 11, 1998
Brian Hopkins	PPE Coordinator, Oregon Health Division (Boardman)	December 18, 1998
<i>Morrow County CSEPP positions</i>		
Casey Beard	Director, CSEPP and Emergency Management	December 9, 1998
Darcy Bergstrom	Systems Administrator	December 9, 1998
Martha Doherty	Hazard Analyst/ADP	December 9, 1998
Dan Knoll	Public Information Officer	December 9, 1998
<i>Umatilla County CSEPP positions</i>		
Dennis Olson	Director, Department of Resource Services and Development	December 8, 1998
Barbara Bishop	Hazard Analyst	December 8, 1998
Anita Griffith	CSEPP Office Manager	December 9, 1998
Meg Capps	Public Information Officer	December 21, 1998
Tom Groat ^a	Acting co-director, CSEPP	December 8, 1998
<i>Bi-County CSEPP positions</i>		
Dan Lonai	CSEPP Systems Analyst	December 8, 1998
Kaye Estes	CSEPP Communications Coordinator	December 9, 1998

^a This position is not funded by CSEPP.